Valuing traceability of imported beef in Korea: an experimental auction approach*

The major objective of this study is to estimate Korean food shoppers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for imported beef with traceability. We use an experimental elicitation method, the random nth price auction, to identify consumers’ valuation for traceable imported beef. We also analyse the effect of different types of information on these valuations. Results indicate that consumers are generally willing to pay a 39 per cent premium for the traceable imported beef over similar beef without traceability. Results also suggest that in contrast to the insignificant effect of positive information, negative and two‐sided information about traceability significantly reduces WTP.     

Do foreign companies pay higher wages than their local counterparts in Malaysian manufacturing?

This paper shows that foreign companies pay higher wages than their local counterparts in Malaysian manufacturing. Step-wise regression analysis shows that this is due to two factors. The first, and perhaps the more important, is the greater capital intensity of the production processes used by foreign companies. The second is their tendency to pay wages that they consider, or that are considered to be, commensurate with the wages that they pay in their home countries. This may be called the demonstration effect of wage remuneration in less developed countries.     

Authority and communication in the laboratory

We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed in another game in which the delegation outcome payoff-dominates the unique babbling communication outcome; yet there is a non-negligible fraction of principal-subjects who holds on to their authority and agent-subjects who transmits some information. A level-k analysis of the game indicates that a principal-subject “under-delegates” due to the belief that her less-than-fully-strategic opponent will provide information; such belief is in turn consistent with the actual play.     

GDP Growth Rates Calculated from Quarterly National Accounts: Discrepancies and Revisions

The differences between income-based and expenditure-based rates of real GDP growth are examined. The extent to which initial growth rates are subsequently affected by data revisions is documented. Results of regressions of first reported growth rates on the growth rates reported in QNA June 1985 are presented for three samples - the sample of income-based estimates of GDP growth rates, the sample of expenditure-based estimates and the sample of mean rates (average of the two estimates).     

The Sophisticated and the Simple: the Profitability of Contrarian Strategies

A variety of variables have been used to form contrarian portfolios, ranging from relatively simple measures, like book‐to‐market, cash flow‐to‐price, earnings‐to‐price and past returns, to more sophisticated measures based on the Ohlson model and residual income model (RIM). This paper investigates whether: (i) contrarian strategies based on RIM perform better or worse than those based on the Ohlson model; (ii) contrarian strategies based on more sophisticated valuation models (e.g. Ohlson and RIM) perform much better than the relatively simpler ranking variables that have been used so extensively in the finance literature. Given that the RIM and Ohlson models require greater information inputs and technical know‐how, and make different implicit assumptions on future abnormal earnings, it is important to ascertain if they offer significantly greater contrarian profits to outweigh the increased costs that they entail. Indeed, our surprising finding is that simple cash flow‐to‐price measures appear to do almost as well as the more sophisticated alternatives. One would have expected the sophisticated models to significantly outperform the simple cash flow to price model for the reasons given by Penman (2007) .     

Buyer Loyalty in Business Markets: Can the Firm and Salesperson Get What They Truly Desire?

Purpose: Prior literature has acknowledged multi-foci customer loyalties (loyalty to the selling firm and salesperson-owned loyalty) and argued that both entities (selling firms and salespersons) foster customer loyalty through respective loyalty-capturing efforts (relationship investments). However, scholars have not investigated the influences of different types of interfirm relationship-specific investment (RSI) activities and salesperson behaviors (brand-building and guanxi behavior) on customer loyalty to the selling firm and salesperson-owned loyalty, especially their simultaneous (interaction) effects. The current research attempts to address this issue and examines the impacts that RSIs and salesperson behaviors have on customer loyalties.

Methodology/approach: A survey of seller–buyer dyads was conducted to test the proposed theoretical model and hypotheses. Using 192 dyadic data from customers and salespersons in the Chinese business-to-business contexts, this study specifies the direct and interactive effects of sellers’ RSIs and salespersons’ behaviors on customer loyalties.

Findings: Results indicate that selling firms’ loyalty-capturing efforts—property-based and knowledge-based RSIs—have different influences on two types of customer loyalty. Salespersons’ relationship investments—brand-building and guanxi behaviors—also have asymmetric impacts on customer loyalty. Counterintuitively, salespersons’ loyalty-capturing efforts weaken the relationships between firms’ RSIs and customer loyalties.

Originality/value/contribution: This study specifies different types of relationship investments and examines their respective and interactive impacts on two types of customer loyalty—loyalty to the selling firm and salesperson-owned loyalty. The findings indicate that firms’ and salespersons’ efforts may lead to unexpected and unintended effects on multi-foci loyalties. Therefore, the current study enriches our knowledge about multi-foci loyalty management and relationship marketing.

Practical implications: Because firms’ and salespersons’ loyalty-capturing strategies exert positive direct influences on loyalty to the selling firm and salesperson-owned loyalty, both entities may actively leverage relationship investments’ impact on customer loyalty. However, as the interactive effects derived from concurrent loyalty-enhancing activities are negative, firms need to clearly assess the nature and

characteristics of their relationship with buyers and properly design relationship investments and guide salesperson behaviors. Managers should use property-based RSIs as a primary safeguard of customer loyalty to the selling firm. Meanwhile, internal branding and training programs can help salespersons develop brand building behaviors and better understand the potential unintended outcomes that different behaviors may induce. Aligning a branding goal between the firm and salespersons can benefit both parties while avoiding counter-productive outcomes.     

Revenue implication of auction value in <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-price sealed-bid auctions: An experimental study

In this paper, we show that in a heterogeneous bidding community with predominantly risk-seeking bidders, third-price sealed-bid auctions yield higher revenue for the seller than first-price sealed-bid auctions when the auction value is low. Conversely, when the value of the auction is high, first-price sealed-bid auctions yield higher revenue for the seller than third-price sealed-bid auctions. Existing theoretical findings for a homogeneous group of risk-seeking individuals imply that third-price sealed-bid auctions should generate higher revenues for the seller than first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our results for low-value auctions agree but our results for high-value auctions do not agree with the existing findings. We discuss the implications of this discrepancy as a function of the shift in goal orientation from a win-focus to a value-focus as the value of the auction increases.